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In a grid-constrained transactive distribution system market, 
distribution locational marginal pricing (DLMP) is influenced by 
the distance from the substation to an energy user, thereby causing 
households that are further away from the substation to be 
charged more. The Jain’s index of fairness, which has been 
recently applied to alleviate this undesirable effect in efficient 
energy allocations, is used in this research to quantify fairness. It 
is shown that the Jain’s index is strictly quasi-concave. A bilevel 
distributed mechanism is proposed, where at the lower level, 
auction mechanisms are invoked simultaneously at each 
aggregator to obtain energy costs under market equilibrium 
conditions. A constrained multi-gradient ascent algorithm, 
Augmented Lagrangian Multigradient Approach (ALMA), is 
proposed for implementation at the upper level to attain energy 
allocations that represent tradeoffs between efficiency and 
fairness. Theoretical issues pertaining to ALMA as a generic 
algorithm for constrained vector optimization are considered. It is 
shown that when the objectives are restricted to be strictly quasi-
concave functions and if the feasible region is convex, ALMA 
converges towards global Pareto optimality. The overall 
effectiveness of the proposed approach is confirmed through a set 
of MATLAB simulations implemented on a modified IEEE 37-bus 
system platform. 
Index Terms—Transactive energy, distribution locational 
marginal price, fair allocation, Fritz-John conditions, Jain’s index, 
market equilibrium, multi-gradient ascent,  Pareto-optimality, 
vector optimization. 
I.  NOMENCLATURE 
𝒩    Set of nodes in grid, |𝒩| = 𝑁  
𝒜     Subset of nodes with aggregators, |𝒜| = 𝐴 
𝑘     Node index, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒩 
𝑝𝑘      Power injection into node, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜 
𝑐𝑘     Per unit cost of node 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜 
𝒢𝑘    Set of agents at aggregator𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜, 𝐺𝑘 = |𝒢𝑘| 
𝒢𝑘
p
, 𝒢𝑘
C   Producer and consumer subsets of 𝒢𝑘 
𝑖     Index of agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘  
𝑝𝑘
𝑖     Energy demand of agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘 
𝑔𝑘
𝑖 , 𝑎𝑘
𝑖 , 𝑏𝑘
𝑖   Generation and utility parameters of 𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘 
𝑃0    Total energy at DSO 
𝑐0     Unit cost at DSO 
𝐩𝑘    𝐺𝑘 × 1 energy vector at aggregator 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜 
𝐜     𝐴 × 1 unit cost vector 
𝐩     𝐴 × 1 energy allocation vector 
𝐂𝑉, 𝐜𝑙
𝑉, 𝐜𝑢
𝑉  Voltage constraint related constants 
𝐂𝑆, 𝐜0
𝑆   Line capacity related constraint constants 
𝐜𝑃0,𝑐0
𝑃0 , 𝐜0
𝑆 Energy balance condition related constants                   
𝛀(∙)    Vector objective function 
𝒲(∙)    Global welfare function 
ℛ(∙)    Global fairness function 
𝐽(∙)    Jain’s index of fairness 
𝒰𝑘(∙)   Aggregated utility of aggregator 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜 
𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (∙)   Utility of 𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘 
ℱ𝐱    Feasible set of 𝐱 ∈ {𝐩,𝛚} 
𝛂, ?̅?, 𝛃, 𝜆, 𝛾  KKT dual variables 
𝛏     Fritz-John dual variable  
𝛚     Feasible multi-gradient direction 
𝜈     Scaling factor 
𝜂𝑘
𝑋    Step size with superscript 𝑋 denoting a variable 
 
In this list, only the main symbols used throughout the paper 
are shown. Other symbols are abstract combinations of these 
symbols or explained in the text. Bold lowercase and bold, 
italicized uppercase symbols represent vectors while bold 
uppercase symbols represent matrices. Scripted symbols are 
used to depict sets as well as global level functions. 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
UE to recent advancements in technology as well as 
economic and environmental consideration, households 
may now be equipped with their own PV (photovoltaic) 
equipment, enabling them to participate in two-way energy 
exchange. Under these circumstances, uniform energy pricing 
policies are giving way to more elaborate differential pricing 
schemes. Distribution locational marginal pricing (DLMP) in 
transactive energy markets has received significant research 
attention [1],[2],[3],[4],[5],[6]. An unfortunate consequence of 
DLMP pricing is the inherent unfairness in charging users in the 
distribution grid, particularly those that are further away from 
the substation, with higher unit energy costs. 
Energy allocation algorithms usually aim at maximizing the 
welfare i.e. total of all utilities of the prosumers (energy users, 
e.g. domestic households) in the grid [7] while ignoring the 
issue of fairness. Welfare maximizing algorithms are termed 
efficient algorithms in game theoretic parlance. Efficient 
approaches have routinely used in the energy market ([7], 
[8],[9],[10]). Published research on efficient energy allocation 
generally represent the transactive energy market with three 
categories of agents. The  distribution system operator (DSO) 
is the uppermost agent. It acts as the interface between the 
market and external agencies such as the wholesale energy 
market. The DSO directly communicates with a set of 
aggregator agents, that are responsible for more real-time 
operation of the grid, as well as to decompose a DSO-level 
objective function into more computationally tractable 
components. Each aggregator communicates directly with its 
own set of prosumer agents, allowing them to participate in 
two-way energy trade.  
In this research, a vector optimization algorithm is proposed 
to simultaneously maximize efficiency and fairness, the latter 
being quantified in terms of the Jain’s index of fairness. The 
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approach is an extension of the gradient ascent algorithm used 
in scalar optimization. The algorithm is capable of handling 
physical and other constraints imposed by the grid. Vector 
optimization is applied at the upper level of a bilevel framework 
and implemented by the DSO. The lower level incorporates 
distributed auction algorithms where energy users participate as 
bidding agents, is implemented by the aggregators.  
A.  Related Work on Energy Markets 
Several DLMP-based pricing methods make use of DC 
optimal power flow (DCOPF) [1],[11],[12],[13] to establish 
physical constraints. Unfortunately DCOPF based approaches 
do not incorporate significant factors such as losses, voltage 
deviations, and reactive power flows essential in transactive 
distribution system markets. Furthermore, lower x/r ratios in 
the distribution system introduce significant errors in DCOPF-
based DLMP [2]. Hence, a few recent approaches using some 
form of AC optimal power flow (ACOPF) have been proposed 
[2],[3],[4],[7]. Unfortunately, the issue of fairness has been 
largely overlooked. 
Recently, a method in [14] applies the well-known Jain’s 
index to alleviate the inherent spatial unfairness in DLMP 
approaches. This fairness measure is used in the form of a 
weighted regularization term that is added to a welfare-based 
objective function. The bilevel mechanism proposed therein 
obtains an otherwise efficient allocation of energy among the 
agents. Dual decomposition of the underlying constrained 
optimization problem, where the constraints are a result of 
grid’s voltage and line flow limits and budget and energy 
balance conditions, provides the means for the DSO to directly 
compute DLMP costs. Since it is the DSO that determines (i.e. 
‘sets’) the unit costs under DLMP, we call such a scheme a cost-
setting mechanism. 
A more game-theoretic scheme has been proposed recently 
where the DSO sets the energy allocated to the aggregators [7]. 
This power-setting mechanism allows unit costs to be 
established at the aggregator level using an auction process 
where the costs converge towards a fixed point. This scheme is 
illustrated in Fig. 1. where the DSO sends allocated power 
signals to the downstream aggregators, receiving unit costs 
from the latter. In cost-setting auctions, the signals would flow 
in the reverse direction; aggregators would receive costs from 
the DSO and send back their energy demands. Power-setting 
mechanisms offer a number of advantages over cost-setting 
ones, which are as follows. 
(i)  Power-setting mechanisms allow the prosumer agents to 
participate in auctions where they are allowed to buy or 
sell energy, in the same manner as other resources are 
traded in a classical marketplace. 
(ii) Power-setting mechanisms establish Nash equilibrium 
among the set of participating agents in each aggregator. 
From a game-theoretic standpoint, this is highly 
significant as no prosumer agent stands to gain by 
consuming energy that deviates from its placed bid. 
(iii)  At the fixed points of the auctions, the unit costs are 
uniform over all agents and reflect market prices that 
automatically maximize the sum of all agent utilities 
within each aggregator – a phenomenon that is called “the 
invisible hand of the market” in Keynesian economics.  
(iv) By shifting some of the computational burden to the 
aggregators, the DSO can use simpler optimization 
algorithms. For instance [7] uses proximal gradient ascent, 
which is not suitable for a cost-setting DSO. 
(v)  Similar market oriented approaches are gaining popularity 
in other engineering applications, such as spectrum 
allocation [15], cloud computing [16], and robot task 
allocation [17]. 
(vi)  Power-setting auctions can easily operate during islanded 
grid conditions, where the distribution grid must function 
entirely in isolation. 
The last observation warrants further elaboration. An 
islanded microgrid [18] is one that is isolated from upstream 
retailers. As the DSO does not receive any energy from external 
sources, transactions can only take place when PV-equipped 
households supply energy at higher costs to others. A cost-
setting DSO that determines the monetary amount that 
downstream elements are charged in order to receive energy, is 
ill-equipped to operate in such situations. In sharp contrast, a 
power-setting DSO can easily establish energy trade using a 
market-oriented approach with the unit cost converging to the 
fixed point. In contrast to the cost-setting approach in [14], this 
research applies vector optimization under a power-setting 
format to exploit these advantages. 
B.  Related Work on Vector Optimization 
Vector optimization are optimization approaches with 
vector objective functions. For decades, the simultaneous 
optimization of more than one objective function, has been 
implemented by means of multi-objective evolutionary 
algorithms such as genetic algorithms and particle swarm 
optimization (cf. [19],[20]). They have been applied to a 
plethora of problems in the energy market 
[21],[22],[23],[24],[25]. Multi-objective evolutionary 
algorithms are well equipped to handle constraints by either 
repairing infeasible solutions or simply rejecting them. 
Unfortunately as they incorporate stochastic operations, multi-
objective evolutionary algorithms have to evaluate a large 
number of poor solutions (in terms of the objective functions) 
before converging to a Pareto-optimal set. As population-based 
approaches, evolutionary optimization cannot directly be 
applied to improve within a few quick steps any existing 
solution that is already close to Pareto optimality. Lastly, 
theoretical convergence guarantees of this class of algorithms 
are only of an indirect nature that approximate the algorithmic 
processes as discrete Markov chains. Lastly, evolutionary 
methods tend to be applied in situations without ascertaining 
the presence of a large number of local optima a priori, where 
simpler methods would have sufficed. 
Deterministic vector optimization is a newer alternative to 
evolutionary algorithms. Normalized boundary intersection 
(NBI) is an indirect method of scalarization. It identifies the 
ideal solution in the objective function space from known 
theoretical bounds. Thereafter NBI directs the search towards 
the ideal point by means of conventional scalar optimization 
techniques. In [26], which applies NBI, the vector objective 
comprises of the scalar objectives of all aggregators. NBI is 
proposed as a method to minimize a vector of uncertainties in 
pricing in [27]. Unfortunately, NBI is prone to yielding 
solutions that are not in the Pareto front (i.e. the image manifold 
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of the Pareto-optimal set). Conversely there are some regions in 
the Pareto front that are inaccessible to NBI [28]. 
Multi-gradient algorithms are a class of nascent algorithms 
that extend the steepest ascent method to vector objectives, 
some of them subsequently extended to quasi-Newton and 
second order methods. The early work in [29] defines a feasible 
ascent direction in terms of Hessian approximation. The multi-
gradient descent approach (MGDA) in [30] uses a geometric 
definition of a feasible ascent direction. As MGDA is, to the 
best of the authors’ knowledge, the only multi-gradient 
algorithm to have been adopted for any significant application 
domain [31],[32], it forms the basis of the approach proposed 
here. Unfortunately, MGDA is not equipped to handle 
constraints [33]. In [34], and more recently in [35], penalty 
function approaches are proposed to handle constraints. A very 
recent approach for constrained vector optimization (CVOP) 
has been proposed in [36] that extends Zoutendijk’s method to 
handle active constraints. 
It must be noted that there are numerous other approaches 
through which vector objectives can be handled, such as 
optimizing the weighted sums of objectives, lexicographic 
ordering, or elastic constraint methods [37]. The above 
discussion was confined only to the major classes of approaches 
that have found energy grid applications along with vector 
gradient ascent, which is relevant here. 
C.  Technical Contributions 
This paper proposes a novel approach to obtain Pareto 
optimal energy allocations representative of the tradeoff 
between efficiency and fairness, where fairness is quantified in 
terms of the Jain’s index. At first, necessary and sufficient 
conditions for Pareto optimality are formally established. The 
overall problem is formulated in terms of a CVOP, with the 
constraints comprising of the physical grid’s voltage deviation 
and power flow limits, as well as cost and energy balance 
conditions. This vector objective framework allows a two-stage 
optimization algorithm to obtain tradeoff energy allocations 
that compromise some efficiency for more fair allocation. 
The proposed algorithm, referred to hereafter as augmented 
Lagrangian multi-gradient ascent (ALMA), that is used to 
attain Pareto optimality, is implemented by the DSO. This 
bilevel approach applies primal decomposition to let the 
aggregators establish market equilibrium conditions, 
independently of one another and within their own subsets of 
energy users. Users in this research include seller agents in 
addition to a larger set of buyer agents. Due to DLMP pricing, 
it is imperative to keep track of dual variables in the iterative 
algorithm, which could not be implemented using the earlier 
approach in [7]. 
The major contributions of the proposed research are 
categorized below. 
(i)  The proposed ALMA relies on the recently proposed 
MGDA, which has so far only found limited applications. 
Furthermore, ALMA is a novel scheme that couples the 
well-known augmented Lagrangian method, which is 
intended for constrained scalar optimization, with an 
enhanced version of MGDA that can now handle 
constraints. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, such an 
approach has not been used elsewhere in constrained 
vector optimization. Moreover, ALMA is a general-
purpose approach for CVOP that can readily be adopted to 
similar engineering and other domains. 
(ii) Although there is no dearth of literature on multi-objective 
optimization in energy systems, again to the best of the 
authors’ knowledge, this research is the first to introduce 
to the energy systems community, an emergent class of 
vector optimization methods along with its accompanying 
mathematical underpinnings. 
(iii)  At the same time, the energy market offers the opportunity 
for ALMA’s performance to be evaluated for large scale 
optimization, under the presence of a large number of 
constraints, that when put together outnumber the number 
of decision variables.  
(iv) ALMA is implemented within a power-setting 
mechanism, thereby inheriting all the advantages 
proffered by the latter, as outlined earlier in Section I.A. 
(v) The aggregator level auction used here is an improved 
version of that in [7],[38]. Agents no longer have to 
declare their intended roles as buyers or sellers 
beforehand; they can switch roles at any step based on 
changing energy costs during the auction. 
(vi) As ALMA is built-in to this framework, off-the-shelf 
solvers are no longer required for optimization. This 
allows direct access to all quantities involved, including 
dual variables. 
(vii) It is shown that Jain’s fairness index is quasiconcave 
everywhere in the design space. Thereby, it extends 
previous results that showed its concavity only in the first 
orthant [6]. This is a significant result for any application 
that uses the index within an optimization procedure. 
Moreover, it is shown that the output of ALMA is Pareto-
optimal as long as the objective functions are 
quasiconcave. Hence, ALMA is not restricted to purely 
concave utilities as in [4],[6],[7],[8],[13],[38]. 
(viii) To the extent of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to seek Pareto-optimal efficiency-fairness 
tradeoffs with the Jain’s index paired with the generic, 
widely accepted measure of welfare, instead of more 
synthetic measures of utilities that are specific to the Jain’s 
index, i.e. 𝛼-fair utility function [39],[40]. 
The rest of this paper is organized in the following manner. 
In Section III, the lower level auction algorithm is briefly 
introduced and the upper level CVOP, formulated. Section IV 
provides a theoretical analysis of ALMA. The simulation 
results are detailed in Section V. Finally this research concludes 
in Section VI where limitations of this approach are outlined, 
and future extensions suggested. 
III.  FRAMEWORK 
Fig. 1 is a schematic of the bilevel framework. The upper 
level mechanism is implemented by the DSO, which possesses 
physical information pertaining to the distribution grid. It 
communicates power allocations 𝑝𝑘 from each aggregator, 𝑘 ∈
𝒜, and receives equilibrium unit costs 𝑐𝑘 from them. Only a 
subset 𝒜 of 𝒩 are aggregators. Each aggregator 𝑘 contains a 
set 𝒢𝑘 of prosumers within a physical neighborhood. The 
information flow between an aggregator and its agents 𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘 
are energy allocations, 𝑝𝑘
𝑖  as well as unit costs, 𝑐𝑘
𝑖 .  
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Fig. 1. Schematic of market-driven bilevel mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.  Aggregator Mechanism 
There are two sets of agents in each aggregator 𝑘 – the set 
𝒢𝑘
p
 of power bidders that receive unit costs and return power 
bids, as well as the set of cost bidders 𝒢𝑘
C that receive power 
allocations and return cost bids. Both sets contain selfish agents 
that place bids to maximize their own payoffs, 𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (𝑝𝑘
𝑖 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ) −
𝑐𝑘
𝑖 𝑝𝑘
𝑖 . As shown in Fig. 2, the utility functions 𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (⋅) are 
assumed to be strictly quasiconcave, monotonically increasing, 
differentiable, and includes the origin (as in [41]). The quantity 
𝑔𝑘
𝑖  is the PV generation. A similar assumption of quasiconcave 
utilities has been adopted in [9] for energy trade between 
vehicles and the grid. 
The auction algorithm is outlined below. The quantity  𝑆𝑘 is 
called the supply and is the sum of the power 𝑝𝑘 supplied by the 
DSO and those that the agents in 𝒢𝑘
p
 are willing to sell to the 
aggregator at unit cost 𝑐𝑘. Similarly, the quantity 𝑅𝑘 is the total 
monetary revenue that the aggregator will garner from the 
buying agents in 𝒢𝑘
C. Although these can be initialized in 
various possible ways, e.g. randomly, the number of iterations 
can be reduced drastically if the converged values from a 
previous auction (of aggregator 𝑘) are used. The step where 
they as well as 𝑝𝑘
𝑖 , 𝑐𝑘
𝑖 , 𝐴𝑘 and 𝑅𝑘 are initialized is excluded from 
the outline of the auction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the beginning of each iteration, the aggregator reassigns 
to 𝒢𝑘
C any agent 𝑖 that was previously in 𝒢𝑘
P but intends to buy 
power 𝑝𝑘
𝑖 ≥ 0 (step 1). Likewise, it transfers any agent  𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘
P 
that has placed a unit cost bid 𝑐𝑘
𝑖 < 𝑐𝑘 to 𝒢𝑘
C (step 2). In step 3, 
the aggregator level unit cost 𝑐𝑘 is computed anew as the ratio 
of revenue 𝑅𝑘, to supply 𝑆𝑘. Next, the aggregator holds an 
auction within all sellers in 𝒢𝑘
p
 (step 4) and receives as bids, the 
amounts of power 𝑝𝑘
𝑖  that they are willing to sell at the uniform 
rate, 𝑐𝑘. Following the sellers’ auction, it updates the value of 
𝐴𝑘. In step 6, which is referred to as proportionally fair 
allocation [7],[38], the aggregator divides the total power 
supply available 𝑆𝑘 among the agents in 𝒢𝑘
C in proportion to the 
total monetary amount that they are willing to pay. It holds an 
auction with the agents in 𝒢𝑘
C bidding new values of 𝑐𝑘
𝑖  (step 7) 
In step 8, the aggregator updates 𝑅𝑘 using the received bids, by 
summing the products 𝑐𝑘
𝑖𝑝𝑘
𝑖  over all agents in 𝒢𝑘
C. 
receive 𝑝𝑘 from DSO 
until (market equilibrium) do 
1. 𝒢𝑘
P ← 𝒢𝑘
P\{𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘
p
|𝑝𝑘
𝑖 ≥ 0} 
𝒢𝑘
C ← 𝒢𝑘
C ∪ {𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘
p
|𝑝𝑘
𝑖 ≥ 0} 
2. 𝒢𝑘
C ← 𝒢𝑘
C\{𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘
P|𝑐𝑘
𝑖 < 𝑐𝑘} 
𝒢𝑘
P ← 𝒢𝑘
P ∪ {𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘
P|𝑐𝑘
𝑖 < 𝑐𝑘} 
3. 𝑐𝑘 ←
𝑅𝑘
𝐴𝑘
 
4. ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘
P:   𝑝𝑘
𝑖 ← argmax
𝑥
(𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (𝑥 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ) − 𝑐𝑘𝑥) 
5.  𝑆𝑘 ← 𝑝𝑘 − 𝟏|𝒢𝑘
P|
T [𝑝𝑘
𝑖 ]
𝑖∈𝒢𝑘
p 
6. ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘
C:   𝑝𝑘
𝑖 ←
𝑐𝑘
𝑖 𝑝𝑘
𝑖
𝑅𝑘
𝑆𝑘 
7. ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘
C:   𝑐𝑘
𝑖 ← argmax
𝑥
(𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (
𝑆𝑘𝑝𝑘
𝑖
𝑅𝑘
𝑥 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ) − 𝑥𝑝𝑘
𝑖 ) 
8. 𝑅𝑘 ← 𝟏|𝒢𝑘
C|
T [𝑝𝑘
𝑖 ]𝑖∈𝒢𝑘
C ∘ [𝑐𝑘
𝑖 ]𝑖∈𝒢𝑘
C 
end do 
send 𝑐𝑘 to DSO 
As seen in steps 1 and 2 of each auction iteration, the agents 
are assigned as buyers or sellers using their bids from the 
preceding iteration. This is different from earlier versions of the 
algorithms in [7],[34]. Assuming that no agent is reassigned in 
steps 1 and 2, the aggregator mechanism’s convergence towards 
a fixed point is shown in Fig. 3. It shows the supply 𝑆𝑘 of the 
sellers in response to a cost 𝑐𝑘 (red curve). The demand (blue 
curve) is the ratio 
𝑅𝑘
𝑆𝑘
 after the buyers have placed their bids. 
Starting from an initial cost of 𝑐𝑘 = 𝑐𝑘
0, the auction converges 
to 𝑐𝑘 = 𝑐𝑘
∗  in the counter-clockwise direction. It may be 
observed that a steeper supply curve would render the fixed 
point unstable. Divergence can be easily detected within two 
iterations of the auction, in which case the mechanism can be 
implemented in the clockwise direction for convergence. As 
this situation is unlikely to happen in any realistic setting (and 
in our simulations), it has not been elaborated further. 
The aggregator’s total utility is given by, 
𝒰𝑘(𝑝𝑘) = 𝟏𝐺𝑘
T [𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (𝑝𝑘
𝑖 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 )]𝑖∈𝒢𝑘                    (1) 
Theorem-1 below shows that the aggregators reach an 
equilibrium unit cost 𝐜 that is equal to ∇𝐩𝒲(𝐩), where 𝒲(𝐩) =
𝟏𝐴
T[𝒰𝑘(𝑝𝑘)]𝑘∈𝒜  is the welfare. In  [41] this gradient is referred 
to as the marginal benefit. It will be assumed that the agents do 
not bid strategically (see [25],[38]) so that the unit cost 𝑐𝑘 is 
independent of the placed bid 𝑥 = {𝑝𝑘
𝑖 , 𝑐𝑘
𝑖 }, i.e. 
𝜕𝑐𝑘
𝜕𝑥
= 0. The 
proof of Theorem-1 is more straightforward than and distinct 
from the indirect one in [7], where the statement of Theorem-1 
was shown to be a limiting case of virtual bidding. 
Theorem-1. At the fixed point of the auction in aggregator 𝑘, 
the equilibrium cost is such that, 
∇𝐩𝒲(𝐩) = 𝐜.                                         (2) 
Proof: Consider a sellers’ bidding strategy as shown in step 4. 
If the bid is 𝑥 its payoff is 𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (𝑥 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ) − 𝑐𝑘𝑥. The payoff is 
maximum when its derivative with respect to 𝑥 is zero; so it 
𝑔𝑘
𝑖
𝑢𝑘
𝑖 𝑥
𝑥
buy
𝑝𝑘
𝑖 < 0
Quasi-concave utility function 
sell
𝑝𝑘
𝑖  0
Fig. 2. Typical quasiconcave utility function of agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝒢𝑘 
 
 4 
     
 
 
 
 r
         𝑐𝑘
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𝑐𝑘
∗
𝑝𝑘
𝑆𝑘
∗
Fig. 3. Convergence towards fixed point of aggregator auction 
places a power bid such that 
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
[𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (𝑥 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ) − 𝑐𝑘𝑥]𝑥=𝑝𝑘
𝑖 = 0, 
whence 𝑢𝑘
𝑖 ′(𝑝𝑘
𝑖 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ) = 𝑐𝑘 . 
Next, consider a buyer’s bidding at any intermediate 
iteration. If the buyer responds to an allocation 𝑝𝑘
𝑖  with a cost 
bid of 𝑥, from proportional allocation, its share of the total 
power will be 
𝑆𝑘𝑝𝑘
𝑖
𝑅𝑘
 in the next iteration. Assuming a large 𝐺𝑘 
such that 𝑆𝑘 and 𝑅𝑘 can be treated as constant with respect to 
the agent’s bidding strategy, the bid is placed to maximize the 
overall payoff, 𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (
𝑆𝑘𝑝𝑘
𝑖
𝑅𝑘
𝑥 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ) − 𝑥𝑝𝑘
𝑖 . This takes place in step 
7. The derivative with respect to cost is 
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
[𝑢𝑘
𝑖 (
𝑆𝑘𝑝𝑘
𝑖
𝑅𝑘
𝑥 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ) −
𝑥𝑝𝑘
𝑖 ]
𝑥=𝑐𝑘
𝑖
. Equated it to zero, we get, 
𝑆𝑘𝑝𝑘
𝑖
𝑅𝑘
𝑢𝑘
𝑖 ′ (
𝑆𝑘𝑝𝑘
𝑖
𝑅𝑘
𝑐𝑘
𝑖 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ) =
𝑝𝑘
𝑖 . At the fixed point, in step 6 we must have, 𝑝𝑘
𝑖 =
𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑘
𝑖
𝑅𝑘
𝑆𝑘, so 
that 𝑐𝑘
𝑖 =
𝑅𝑘
𝑆𝑘
. Under these circumstances the sellers bid is such 
that 𝑢𝑘
𝑖 ′(𝑝𝑘
𝑖 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ) = 𝑐𝑘 . 
Therefore it is seen that the equality 𝑢𝑘
𝑖 ′(𝑝𝑘
𝑖 + 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 ) = 𝑐𝑘 
applies to buyers and sellers. The statement of the theorem 
follows directly since 𝑝𝑘 = 𝟏𝐺𝑘
T [𝑝𝑘
𝑖 ]𝑖∈𝒢𝑘 . 
∎ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  Constraints 
Let 𝑃0 be the total energy that the DSO receives from 
external sources at a unit cost 𝑐0. The constraints imposed on 
ALMA are as follows. The voltages at all nodes in 𝒩 must 
remain within their minimum and maximum limits 
(lower/upper voltage deviation constraints). The active and 
reactive power flows in the lines must not exceed their 
capacities (capacity limit constraint). Additionally, 𝑃0 must 
equal the sum of the energy delivered to the aggregators and the 
losses occurring at the lines (energy balance condition). Lastly, 
the amount that the DSO must pay to external sellers must not 
exceed the total revenue obtained from the aggregator (budget 
balance condition). With appropriate values of all coefficients, 
these constraints can be expressed concisely as follows 
(detailed derivation can be found in [14]), 
{
 
 
 
 
−𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑙
𝑉 ≤ 𝟎,          (v l ag    v a    )
𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑢
𝑉 ≤ 𝟎,              (v l ag    v a    ) 
𝐂𝑆𝐩 + 𝐜0
𝑆 ≤ 𝟎,               ( a a     l m   )      
𝐜𝑃0
T
𝐩 + 𝑐0
𝑃0 − 𝑃0 = 0, (   rg  bala   )     
−𝐜T𝐩 + 𝑐0𝑃0 ≤ 0,         (b  g   bala   )     
.         (3) 
Thus, the feasible set of allocations 𝐩 is given by, 
ℱ𝐩 ≜ {𝐩|
−𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑙
𝑉 ≤ 𝟎, 𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑢
𝑉 ≤ 𝟎,
𝐂𝑆𝐩 + 𝐜0
𝑆 ≤ 𝟎,
𝐜𝑃0
T
𝐩 + 𝑐0
𝑃0 − 𝑃0 = 0,−𝐜
T𝐩 + 𝑐0𝑃0 ≤ 0
} . (4) 
C.  Jain’s Index of Fairness 
The generic expression for Jain’s index of fairness with 
argument 𝐱 is as follows, 
𝐽(𝐱) =
1
‖𝟏‖2
(𝟏T𝐱)2
𝐱T𝐱
.                                    (5) 
The main motivation behind the choice of Jain’s index as the 
measure of fairness is its Schur concavity, which is expressed 
as 𝐱 ≽ 𝐲 ⇒ 𝐽(𝐱) ≥ 𝐽(𝐲). In other words, if 𝐱 majorizes 𝐲 (𝐱 ≽
𝐲), then 𝐱 has a fairness index that is at least as high as that of 
𝐲. Majorization is explained as follows. Given the 𝑛 
dimensional vector 𝐱, let 𝐱𝑑
†
 denote the 𝑑 < 𝑛 dimensional 
vector formed by taking the numerically smallest 𝑑 elements of 
𝐱. For instance if 𝐱 = [5 1 2 4 3]T then 𝐱3
† = [1 2 3]T. The 
vector 𝐲𝑑
†
 is obtained from 𝐲 in an identical manner. We say that 
𝐱 majorizes 𝐲 if and only if 𝟏𝑛
T𝐱 = 𝟏𝑛
T𝐲 and 𝟏𝑑
T𝐱𝑑
† ≥ 𝟏𝑑
T𝐲𝑑
†, ∀𝑑. 
There is a more intuitive interpretation of this relationship, 
denoted as 𝐱 ≽ 𝐲. Consider a pair of resource demand vectors, 
𝐱 and 𝐲, with equal sums (𝟏𝑛
T𝐱 = 𝟏𝑛
T𝐲) allocated to 𝑛 
aggregators. The quantities 𝟏𝑑
T𝐱𝑑
†
 and 𝟏𝑑
T𝐲𝑑
†
 are the sums of the 
resources received by the 𝑑 aggregators that have the least 
amount of resource allocated. Hence, 𝟏𝑑
T𝐱𝑑
† ≥ 𝟏𝑑
T𝐲𝑑
†
 implies 
that the resource-deprived aggregators collectively receive 
more resource through demand 𝐱 than through demand 𝐲. 
Hence, intuitively 𝐱 ≽ 𝐲 means that 𝐱 is fairer than 𝐲. 
In this research, the 𝐺𝑘 × 1 vector argument 𝐱 of 𝐽(⋅) is 
determined as follows, 
𝐱 = [
𝑝𝑘
𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑘
]
𝑘∈𝒜
.                                       (6) 
Thus, each element consists of the energy 𝑝𝑘, normalized by the 
number of agents 𝐺𝑘 and the unit costs 𝑐𝑘. Dividing the power 
𝑝𝑘 by 𝐺𝑘 ensures that each aggregator receives energy in 
proportion to the total number of household agents in it. The 
presence of 𝑐𝑘 in the denominator, is the DSO level version of 
proportional fairness [38], i.e. each aggregator allocated energy 
should be in proportion to the unit cost that the agents in it are 
willing to pay. 
D.    Constrained Vector Optimization Problem Formulation 
The welfare 𝒲(𝐩) of the DSO is the sum of the utilities of all 
aggregators in 𝒜. The fairness, expressed as a function of 𝐩 =
[𝑝𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜  is denoted as ℛ(𝐩), which is equal to 𝐽(𝐱) as shown in 
(5) where 𝐱 is obtained from (6). The vector objective 𝛀(𝐩) that 
ALMA must simultaneously maximize with respect to 𝐩 ∈ ℱ𝐩 
where ℱ𝐩 is as in (4), is given by, 
𝛀(𝐩) ≜ [
𝒲(𝐩)
ℛ(𝐩)
].                                        (7) 
Theoretical issues related to CVOPs as well as details of 
ALMA are discussed next. 
IV.  PROPOSED APPROACH 
A.  Theoretical Background 
As mentioned earlier, ALMA although developed for this 
application, is a general-purpose algorithm for constrained 
 5 
vector optimization. Accordingly, as well as for conciseness, 
ALMA is discussed using more generic notation in Sections 
IV.A and IV.B. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that all 
objectives in the CVOP are to be maximized. Accordingly, let 
𝐟: ℝ𝑛 → ℝ𝑚 be the vector function to be maximized with 
respect to 𝐱 ∈ ℱ𝐱, where ℱ𝐱 is the feasible set, 
ℱ𝐱 = {𝐱|𝐀
T𝐱 + 𝐚 ≤ 𝟎, 𝐁T𝐱 + 𝐛 = 𝟎}.                   (8)  
Here, 𝐀 ∈ ℝ𝑛×𝑝, 𝐚 ∈ ℝ𝑝×1, 𝐁 ∈ ℝ𝑛×𝑞, 𝐛 ∈ ℝ𝑞×1. The feasible 
region ℱ𝐩 introduced earlier in (4) clearly fits the generic form 
in (8). Scalar objectives in 𝐟(∙) are denoted as 𝑓𝑗(∙), 𝑗 ∈
{1,2, . . . , 𝑚}. It is assumed everywhere that each such function 
is Lipschitz continuous, and differentiable. Since in engineering 
optimization, the dimensionality of the design space is usually 
much higher than that of its image in the objective function 
space (𝑛 ≫ 𝑚), it will be assumed hereafter that 𝑛  𝑚. 
Additionally, it will be assumed in this treatment, that the 
scalar objectives 𝑓𝑗(∙) in 𝐟(∙) are quasiconcave functions. 
Quasiconcavity generalizes the notion of concavity. Any given 
function 𝑓(∙) is (strictly) quasiconcave if and only if for every 
𝜗 ∈ ℝ, the upper contour set {𝐱|𝑓(𝐱) ≥ 𝜗} is (strictly) convex. 
Two sufficient conditions for quasiconcavity are stated in the 
following axiom.  
Axiom-1. With 𝐱, 𝐲 ∈ ℱ𝐱 ⊆ ℝ
𝑛 being any pair of vectors in the 
convex domain ℱ𝐱, either of following inequality is a sufficient 
condition for the quasiconcavity of the function 𝑓(∙), 
{
𝜃 ∈ [0,1] ⇒ 𝑓(𝜃𝐱 + (1 − 𝜃)𝐲) ≥ m  (𝑓(𝐱), 𝑓(𝐲)) = 0,
𝑓(𝐱) ≥ 𝑓(𝐱 + 𝐲) ⇒ 𝐲T∇𝐱𝑓(𝐱) ≥ 0.                                      
(9) 
The function’s quasiconcavity becomes strict if all 
inequalities are strict in the first condition in (9). In addition to 
being sufficient, this condition is also a necessary one for 
quasiconcavity. It may be noted that the second condition in (9) 
defines pseudoconcave functions that is outside the scope of 
this research, and is therefore a stricter requirement than the 
first. Formal proofs can be found in [42],[43]. 
The relationship 𝐟(𝐱)  𝐟(𝐲) is used to denote that 𝑓𝑗(𝐱)  
𝑓𝑗(𝐲), ∀𝑗. Analogous elementwise interpretations apply to the 
remaining inequality relationships ≥,<, and ≤. Given two 
vectors 𝐱, 𝐲 ∈ ℱ𝐱, 𝐱 weakly dominates 𝐲 when 𝐟(𝐱) ≥ 𝐟(𝐲). 
When there is at least some 𝑓𝑗(∙) such than 𝑓𝑗(𝐱)  𝑓𝑗(𝐲), then 
𝐱 dominates 𝐲. This (weak) dominance relationship is denoted 
as 𝐱 ≻ 𝐲 (𝐱 ≽ 𝐲). Any point1  𝐱 ∈ ℱ𝐱 is locally (weakly) Pareto-
optimal if and only if there exists a quantity σ  0 satisfying 
the condition, 
𝐲 ∈ ℱ𝐱 ∩ ℬ(𝐱, σ) ⇒ 𝐱 ≻ 𝐲 (𝐱 ≽ 𝐲).                   (10) 
In the above expression, ℬ(𝐱, σ) ⊂ ℝ𝑛 is a ball centered around 
𝐱 with radius σ, ℬ(𝐱, σ) = {𝐲 ∈ ℝ𝑛|‖𝐲 − 𝐱‖  σ}. If the 
condition (10) holds in the limiting case σ → ∞, then 𝐱 is said 
to be (weakly) Pareto-optimal. The image of the set of all 
Pareto-optimal points is the CVOP’s Pareto front. 
 From here onwards, the 𝑛 × 𝑚 Jacobian matrix will be 
denoted as ∇𝐱𝐟(𝐱) ≜ [∇𝐱𝑓1(𝐱) ⋯ ∇𝐱𝑓𝑀(𝐱)]. For simplicity 
it is assumed to be of full column rank unless noted otherwise. 
There is a useful relationship between the gradient vectors 
∇𝐱𝑓𝑗(𝐱) of the 𝑗 ∈ {1,2, . . . , 𝑚} objectives of a locally Pareto 
optimal point 𝐱. Consider another point, 𝐲 = 𝐱 + δ𝐱 ∈ ℱ𝐱, 
                                                          
1 The terms ‘point’ and ‘vector’ are used interchangeably. 
where δ𝐱 is an infinitesimal perturbation of 𝐱 so that higher 
order terms in the Taylor’s series expansion can be ignored. 
Hence, in the limiting case of δ𝐱 → 𝟎, 𝐟(𝐲) = 𝐟(𝐱) +
∇𝐱
T𝐟(𝐱)δ𝐱. From (10), 𝐟(𝐱)  𝐟(𝐲), so that ∇𝐱
T𝐟(𝐱)δ𝐱 < 𝟎. 
Suppose δ𝐱 is chosen such that all of its components are 
positive (δ𝐱  𝟎). In other words, for every 𝑓𝑗(∙) there must be 
at least one function 𝑓𝑖(∙) such that ∇𝐱
T𝑓𝑖(𝐱)δ𝐱 and ∇𝐱
T𝑓𝑗(𝐱)δ𝐱 
have opposite signs. This observation is significant. If such a δ𝐱 
does not exist, then from the convexity of  ℱ𝐱, another vector 
δ𝐱 < 𝟎 exists, leading to the same observation. Another way of 
interpreting this observation is that from a Pareto optimal point 
any improvement (i.e. increase) in one objective can only be 
accomplished at the expense of another. 
In CVOPs, there exist necessary and sufficient conditions 
that are analogous to the KKT conditions in scalar constrained 
optimization. These are the Fritz-John (FJ) conditions 
[42],[44],[45] for local Pareto optimality. We state these 
conditions in the following axiom. 
Axiom-2. The vector 𝐱 ∈ ℱ𝐱 is locally Pareto optimal if there 
exist vectors 𝛏 ∈ ℝ𝑚, 𝛌 ∈ ℝ𝑝, and 𝛍 ∈ ℝ𝑞 satisfying the 
following conditions, 
 {
𝛏 ≥ 𝟎𝑚;  𝛌 ≥ 𝟎𝑝                 
 𝛌T(𝐀T𝐱 + 𝐚) = 0;               
∇𝐱𝐟(𝐱)𝛏 − 𝐀𝛌 − 𝐁𝛍 = 𝟎𝑝.
                     (11) 
The Fritz-John conditions reduce to the well-known first 
order KKT optimality conditions with 𝛏 ≠ 𝟎𝑚, the weighted 
sum of the objectives, 𝛏T𝐟(𝐱) acting as the equivalent scalar 
objective and treating the function 𝔏(𝐱, 𝛏, 𝛌, 𝛍)  =  𝛏T𝐟(𝐱) −
 𝛌T(𝐀T𝐱 + 𝐚) −  𝛍T(𝐁T𝐱 + 𝐛) as the equivalent Lagrangian 
function, as seen in [32]. 
In multi-gradient ascent algorithms, the common (feasible) 
ascent direction is a vector 𝛚 such that for some δ  0,  𝐱 +
δ𝛚 ≻ 𝐱. Multi-gradient ascent involves iterative increments of 
𝐱 along common ascent directions. Using Taylor’s series 
expansion it can readily be shown that any common ascent 
direction 𝛚 must be expressed as a convex combination of the 
gradients, 
𝛚 = ∇𝐱𝐟(𝐱)𝛏,                                          (12) 
where 𝛏  𝟎. In MGDA, the weights in 𝛏  of the gradients 
∇𝐱𝑓𝑗(𝐱)  are constrained so that 𝟏𝑚
T 𝛏 = 1. The direction 𝛚 is 
chosen to be the minimum norm element in the convex hull of 
the gradients. 
Axiom-3 below, stems from the observation made earlier that 
at a Pareto-optimal point, any gain with respect to an objective 
will always be at the expense of another. Formal proofs can be 
found in [30],[31],[46]. 
Axiom-3. At any point 𝐱 ∈ ℱ𝐱, if no common feasible ascent 
direction satisfying (12) exists, then 𝐱 is locally Pareto optimal. 
B.  Augmented Lagrangian Multi-Gradient Ascent 
Since 𝛚 in (12) will be used to increment 𝐱 ∈ ℱ𝐱, we must 
have 𝐱 + 𝛚 ∈ ℱ𝐱, so that, 𝐀
T(𝐱 + 𝛚) + 𝐚 ≤ 𝟎, and, 𝐁T(𝐱 +
𝛚) + 𝐛 = 𝟎. A sufficient condition on 𝛚 to satisfy the above 
constraints would be that 𝐀T𝛚 ≤ 𝟎, 𝐁T𝛚 = 𝟎. ALMA does not 
aim to bring the point 𝐱 to the feasible region. This goal can be 
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achieved separately through any other constrained optimization 
algorithm. The goal is merely that when ALMA increment 𝐱 by 
𝛚 should not violate the constraint any further. Inequality and 
equality constraints (Fig. 4) are considered separately below. 
(i) Suppose the inequality constraint is inactive so that 𝐀T𝐱 +
𝐚 = 𝛅a < 𝟎. In Fig. 4 (top), this corresponds to the small, green 
circle representing 𝐱. After replacing 𝐱 with 𝐱 + 𝛚, the 
constraint must not be violated. The analogous condition on 𝐱 +
𝛚 is, 𝐀T(𝐱 + 𝛚) + 𝐚 ≤ 𝟎, which upon simplification yields, 
𝐀T𝛚 ≤ −𝛅a. Next, suppose the inequality constraint is violated 
so that 𝐀T𝐱 + 𝐚 = 𝛅a  𝟎, with such an 𝐱 shown as a red circle 
in Fig. 4 (top). For ALMA not to move 𝐱 + 𝛚 further away 
from the feasible region than 𝐱, we must have 𝐀T(𝐱 + 𝛚) +
𝐚 ≤ 𝛅a. In other words, 𝐀T𝛚 ≤ 𝟎. Combining both the cases, 
the constraint upon the direction, 𝛚 must be 𝐀T𝛚 ≤ −[𝛅a]−. 
Here, [𝛅]− = m  (𝛅, 𝟎), with the minimization being carried 
out in a component-wise manner. Similarly, [𝛅]+ = max(𝛅, 𝟎). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) Suppose the equality constraint is violated in the positive 
direction so that 𝐁T𝐱 + 𝐛 = 𝛅b  𝟎. Fig. 4 (bottom) depicts 
such a situation where the red circle is to the right of ℱ𝐱 (vertical 
line). As we chose to ensure that the updated variable 𝐱 + 𝛚 not 
move any further away from the feasible region, we must have, 
𝟎 ≤ 𝐁T(𝐱 + 𝛚) + 𝐛 ≤ 𝛅b. This leads to the bounds, −𝛅b ≤
𝐁T𝛚 ≤ 𝟎. Next, suppose the equality constraint is violated in 
the negative direction. In this case, 𝐁T𝐱 + 𝐛 = 𝛅b < 𝟎 yielding 
the bounds, 𝟎 ≤ 𝐁T𝛚 ≤ −𝛅b. Combining both cases together, 
the equivalent condition that 𝐱 + 𝛚 is no further away from ℱ𝐱 
than 𝐱, is given by, −[𝛅b]
+
≤ 𝐁T𝛚 ≤ −[𝛅b]
−
. 
Combining the observations for both kinds of constraints 
allows us to define feasible region ℱ𝛚 for the direction 𝛚 in the 
following manner, 
ℱ𝛚 ≜ {𝛚|
𝐀T𝛚 ≤ −[𝛅a]−,
−[𝛅b]
+
≤ 𝐁T𝛚 ≤ −[𝛅b]
−
},            (13) 
where 𝛅a = 𝐀T𝐱 + 𝐚, and 𝛅b = 𝐁T𝐱 + 𝐛.  
∇𝐱𝐟(𝐱)𝛏 with 𝛏 ≥ 𝟎𝑚, 𝟏𝑚
T 𝛏 = 1 may not guarantee that the 
incremented 𝐱 remains in the feasible region. In ALMA the 
increment 𝛚 on 𝐱 is a fraction 𝜈 ∈ (0,1] of that obtained by 
MGDA such that 𝛚 ∈ ℱ𝛚. Furthermore, 𝜈 should be maximized 
so that the increment is as close to ∇𝐱𝐟(𝐱)𝛏 as possible. This 
leads to the following bilevel problem, 
𝛚 = 𝜈∇𝐱𝐟(𝐱)𝛏,                                      (14a) 
where, 
𝛏, 𝜈 = argmax
0≤𝜈≤1,𝜈𝛏T∇𝐱𝐟 ∈ ℱ𝛚
𝛏= argmin
𝛏≥𝟎,    𝟏T𝛏=1
‖∇𝐱𝐟(𝐱)𝛏‖
𝜈.                        (14b) 
 This scheme is illustrated in Fig. 5 for a bi-objective CVOP. 
The shaded elliptical region represents ℱ𝐱. The vector ∇𝐱𝐟(𝐱)𝛏 
(orange dotted arrow) is the perpendicular bisector of the 
shaded triangle shaped region whose sides are ∇𝐱𝑓1(𝐱) and 
∇𝐱𝑓2(𝐱) (red, dotted arrows).  The increment 𝛚 is the solid 
green arrow in Fig. 5. 
Suppose 𝐱 is infeasible – a situation that occurs commonly in 
exterior point algorithms such as the augmented Lagrangian 
method that ALMA incorporates. Unless the point 𝐱 is 
sufficiently close to ℱ𝐱, there may not exist any 𝜈 ∈ [0,1] such 
that 𝛚 ∈  ℱ𝛚. As a result, ALMA does not increment 𝐱 in the 
direction of the gradients until it is either inside ℱ𝐱 or close 
enough to it. The point is still updated using the terms involving 
the dual variables.  This is a desirable feature as it helps 𝐱 move 
quicker towards the feasible region while allowing the dual 
variables acquire more consistent values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.  DSO Level Pareto-Optimality 
It is now shown that any locally Pareto optimal point 
obtained by ALMA is Pareto optimal. 
Theorem-2. Jain’s index 𝐽(⋅) is strictly quasiconcave in ℝ𝑛. 
Proof: Let 𝐱, 𝐲 ∈ ℝ𝑛 be two independent non-zero vectors such 
that 𝑓(𝐱) ≥ 𝑓(𝐱 + 𝐲). For a function 𝑓(⋅) to be quasiconcave, 
𝐲T∇𝐱𝑓(𝐱) ≥ 0. Suppose 𝐱, 𝐲 are such that 𝑓(𝐱) ≥ 𝑓(𝐱 + 𝐲) and 
𝐲T∇𝐱𝑓(𝐱) = 0. From the generalized mean value theorem, 
there must exist a 𝜌 ∈ [0,1], such that, 𝑓(𝐱 + 𝐲) = 𝑓(𝐱) +
𝐲T∇𝐱𝑓(𝐱) +
1
2
𝐲T∇𝐱
2𝑓(𝐱 + 𝜌(𝐲 − 𝐱))𝐲. As 𝑓(𝐱) ≥ 𝑓(𝐱 + 𝐲) 
and 𝐲T∇𝐱𝑓(𝐱) = 0, it must be true that the third term, 
𝐲T∇𝐱
2𝑓(𝐱 + 𝜌(𝐲 − 𝐱))𝐲 ≤ 0. Letting 𝜌 = 0, a sufficient 
𝛅b < 0 𝛅b  0
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Fig. 4. Feasible regions of 𝛚. 
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condition for 𝑓(⋅) is that if 𝐲T∇𝐱𝑓(𝐱) ≥ 0 for some 𝐱, 𝐲 ∈ ℝ
𝑛, 
then 𝐲T∇𝐱
2𝑓(𝐱)𝐲 ≤ 0.  
From (5) it can be shown that, 
∇𝐱𝐽(𝐱) = 2√𝐽(𝐱) (
𝟏
‖𝟏‖‖𝐱‖
 − √𝐽(𝐱)
𝐱
‖𝐱‖2
).         (15) 
The Hessian of 𝐽(𝐱) can be obtained easily by differentiating 
the above expression, 
∇𝐱
2𝐽(𝐱)𝐲 = −
2
‖𝐱‖2
√𝐽(𝐱) (
𝟏𝐱T
‖𝟏‖‖𝐱‖
 − √𝐽(𝐱)
𝐱𝐱T
‖𝐱‖2
) 
  −
2
‖𝐱‖2
(
−𝟏
‖𝟏‖
+ 2
𝐱
‖𝐱‖
√𝐽(𝐱)) (
𝟏T
‖𝟏‖
 − √𝐽(𝐱)
𝐱T
‖𝐱‖
) 
  −
1
‖𝐱‖2
𝐽(𝐱) (2𝐈 −
𝐱𝐱T
‖𝐱‖2
). 
Rearranging terms and simplifying further using (15) leads to, 
∇𝐱
2𝐽(𝐱)  = −
1
‖𝐱‖2
∇𝐱𝐽(𝐱)𝐱
T 
+(
1
2𝐽(𝐱)
∇𝐱𝐽(𝐱) −
𝐱
‖𝐱‖2
) ∇𝐱
T𝐽(𝐱) 
−
1
‖𝐱‖2
𝐽(𝐱) (2𝐈 −
𝐱𝐱T
‖𝐱‖2
). 
Using the above expression for the Hessian, 
𝐲T∇𝐱
2𝐽(𝐱)𝐲 =
1
‖𝐱‖2
𝐲T∇𝐱𝐽(𝐱)𝐱
T𝐲 
  +𝐲T (
1
2𝐽(𝐱)
∇𝐱𝐽(𝐱) −
𝐱
‖𝐱‖2
) ∇𝐱
T𝐽(𝐱)𝐲 
  −
𝐲T
‖𝐱‖2
𝐽(𝐱) (2𝐈 −
𝐱𝐱T
‖𝐱‖2
) 𝐲. 
Under the assumption that 𝐲T∇𝐱𝐽(𝐱) = 0, the above equality 
can be simplified to, 
𝐲T∇𝐱
2𝐽(𝐱)𝐲 = −
1
‖𝐱‖4
𝐽(𝐱)(2‖𝐱‖2‖𝐲‖2 − (𝐱T𝐲)2). 
From the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, as 𝐱 and 𝐲 are 
independent non-zero vectors, |𝐱T𝐲| < ‖𝐱‖‖𝐲‖ so that 
𝐲T∇𝐱
2𝐽(𝐱)𝐲 < 0. This proves the strict quasiconcavity of 𝐽(𝐱). 
∎ 
Theorem-3 below provides sufficient conditions for the 
convergence of ALMA towards Pareto optimal allocations. 
Theorem-3. If all scalar objectives 𝑓𝑗(∙) of the vector function 
𝐟(∙) are strictly quasiconcave, then any locally Pareto optimal 
point 𝐱 ∈ ℱ𝐱 is globally Pareto optimal. 
Proof: Let 𝐱 be a locally Pareto optimal point. Thus there exists 
a σ  0 such that 𝐱 dominates every other feasible point in the 
ball ℬ(𝐱, σ). Assume that, contrary to the statement of this 
theorem, 𝐱 is not globally Pareto optimal. Under these 
circumstances we pick an arbitrary point 𝐲 ∈ ℱ𝐱 with 
‖𝐱 − 𝐲‖  σ, such that 𝐱 ⋡ 𝐲. In other words, there is an 
objective 𝑓𝑗(∙) such that 𝑓𝑗(𝐲)  𝑓𝑗(𝐱). From (8), the feasible 
region ℱ𝐱 is convex, so that for all 𝜃 ∈ [0,1], the point 𝐳 = 𝜃𝐱 +
(1 − 𝜃)𝐲 must be feasible, i.e. 𝐳 ∈ ℱ𝐱. From (9) the strict 
quasiconcavity of 𝑓𝑗(∙) implies that 𝑓𝑗(𝐳)  m  (𝑓𝑗(𝐱), 𝑓𝑗(𝐲)), 
i.e. 𝑓𝑗(𝐳)  𝑓𝑗(𝐱). If 𝜃 is confined to the smaller interval, 
(0, ‖𝐱 − 𝐲‖−1σ] ⊂ [0,1], then 𝐳 lies inside the ball ℬ(𝐱, σ). 
Since 𝐳 ∈ ℬ(𝐱, σ), 𝐱 ≽ 𝐳 so that 𝑓𝑗(𝐳) ≤ 𝑓𝑗(𝐱), contradicting 
our previous observation that 𝑓𝑗(𝐳)  𝑓𝑗(𝐱). 
∎ 
 Theorem-3 is of significance to the DSO CVOP defined in 
Section III.D. Since it has been assumed that all agents’ utility 
functions are strictly quasiconcave, consequently, 𝒰𝑘(∙), which 
is their sum over disjoint arguments, is also strictly 
quasiconcave. By analogous reasoning, so is the welfare 
function 𝒲(∙). In Theorem-2, the Jain’s index is shown to be 
strictly quasiconcave; therefore the fairness measure, ℛ(∙) is 
also strictly quasiconcave. In other words, all scalar 
components of 𝛀(∙) in (7) are strictly quasiconcave functions, 
whence by Theorem-3 the locally Pareto optimal point obtained 
by ALMA is Pareto optimal. More formal proofs of the theorem 
can be found in [44],[45]. 
D.  DSO Algorithm 
The steps involved in the DSO algorithm are outlined below. 
until (termination) do 
1.  Receive 𝐜 from aggregators 
2.  𝐠 ← ∇𝐩ℛ(𝐩) 
3. 𝛅𝑉 ← −𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑙
𝑉 , 𝛅
𝑉
← 𝐂𝑉𝐩 + 𝐜𝑢
𝑉 
𝛅𝑆 ← 𝐂𝑆𝐩 + 𝐜0
𝑆, 
𝛅𝑃0 ← 𝑪𝑃0𝐩 + 𝑐0
𝑃0 − 𝑃0, 𝛅
B ← −𝐜T𝐩 + 𝑐0𝑃0 
4.  𝐀 ← [
−𝐂𝑉
𝐂𝑉
𝐂𝑆
−𝐜T
]      𝐚 ←
[
 
 
 
−𝐜𝑙
𝑉
−𝐜𝑢
𝑉
−𝐜0
𝑆
−𝑐0𝑃0]
 
 
 
 
 𝐁 ← 𝑪𝑃0 ,            𝐛 ← 𝑐0
𝑃0 − 𝑃0 
5. 𝛏 ← argm  
𝛏≥𝟎,𝟏T𝛏=1
‖∇𝐱𝐟(𝐱)𝛏‖ 
6. 𝛚′ ← ∇𝐱𝐟(𝐱)𝛏 
7.  𝜈 ← max
0≤𝜈≤𝜈max
𝜈𝛚′ ∈ ℱ𝛚
𝜈 
8. 𝛚 ← 𝜈𝛚′ 
9. 𝛂  ← [𝛂 + 𝜈𝜂𝑘
𝑉𝛅𝑉]
+
,     𝛂  ← [𝛂 + 𝜈𝜂𝑘
𝑉𝛅
𝑉
]
+
 
𝛃 ← [𝛃 + 𝜈𝜂𝑘
𝑆𝛅𝑆]+ 
𝜆 ← 𝜆 + 𝜈𝜂𝑘
𝑃0𝛿𝑃0 , 𝛾 ← [𝛾 + 𝜈𝜂𝑘
B𝛿B]
+
 
10. ∆𝐩 ← 𝛚 + 𝐂𝑉
T
𝛂 − 𝐂𝑉
T
𝛂 − 𝐂𝑆
T
𝛃 − 𝜆𝑪𝑃0 + 𝛾𝐜 
   𝐩 ← 𝐩 + 𝜂𝑘
𝑃∆𝐩 
  11. Send 𝐩 to aggregators 
  12. 𝑘 ← 𝑘 + 1 
end 
The DSO algorithm is a specific implementation of ALMA 
for energy allocation in distribution systems. In step 1, the 
aggregator receives the unit cost 𝐜 from aggregator auctions, 
which is equal to ∇𝐩𝒲(𝐩) (Theorem-1). The other gradient, 
∇𝐩ℛ(𝐩) is computed in step 2 where 𝐩 is the value from the 
previous iteration. Using the constraint gaps 𝛅∗ (step 3) the 
quantities involved in ℱ𝐱 in (8) are determined (step 4). Steps 
5–8 implement (12) as follows. Steps 5 and 6 implement ascent 
direction as in MGDA. This is scaled by the factor 𝜈 so that 
increments do not produce infeasible solutions. The dual 
variables are incremented (step 9) in accordance with 
augmented Lagrangian method (see [14] for details), following 
which the energy allocation is incremented (step 10), and 
returned to the aggregator (step 11) for the next round of 
aggregator auctions until convergence towards a locally Pareto 
optimum, which Theorem-3 shows to be Pareto optimal. 
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Fig. 6. IEEE 37-bus system used as simulation platform 
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V.  SIMULATION RESULTS 
The proposed approach use was implemented on a modified 
IEEE 37-bus system as shown in Fig. 6. Nodes containing the 
17 aggregators appear as larger blue circles, whereas the 
remaining nodes are red filled circles. For convenience, the 
aggregators are indexed separately (inset in Fig. 6) The number 
of agents in each aggregator was generated randomly between 
𝐺𝑘 = 9  and 𝐺𝑘 = 25 , with aggregators A4, A6, A10, A12 
having a higher number of prosumers. Some agents were 
equipped with some PV generation ( 𝑔𝑘
𝑖  0 ). The agent 
parameters,  𝑎𝑘
𝑖 , 𝑏𝑘
𝑖 , and 𝑔𝑘
𝑖  (see Fig. 2) were generated 
randomly. All simulations were performed in MATLAB. 
In order to see the effect of fairness, two simulations were 
done. The algorithm in [7] was implemented to obtain the 
efficient solution without any fairness. Following this, the DSO 
algorithm was implemented. Fig. 7 compares the results of both 
simulations. The blue vertical bars are the power allocations of 
the aggregators (𝑝𝑘) that were computed from the simulations 
without fairness. The aggregators’ power allocations are shown 
as vertical bars that are colored blue (without fairness) and 
yellow (with fairness). The solid lines (without fairness) and 
dotted lines (with fairness) in the figure show the unit costs. The 
quantities with fairness are superscripted with asterisks (*). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From Fig. 7 it can be seen that aggregators A1, A9, A10 
received more power at lower unit cost in the absence of 
fairness.  As can be seen in in Fig. 6, these aggregators are 
positioned closer to the substation node (red circle with white 
interior). In contrast, aggregators A3, A12, A16, and A17 which 
are further away, experience higher unit cost and lower power 
allocation. The allocations obtained with fairness show how 
utilizing the Jain’s index helps in mitigating this adverse effect. 
The fairness objective causes aggregators to be charged in a 
more equitable manner. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 shows the progress of the algorithm with iteration. 
Fig 8 (top) shows how the inner product 〈𝒲(𝐩), ℛ(𝐩)〉 
converges towards −1  at the Pareto front. The steadily 
increasing welfare (blue line) and fairness (red line) are shown 
in Fig. 8 (bottom). Note that during the initial stages of the 
algorithm, the solution would be infeasible, explaining the 
initial fluctuations. Although 3,000 iterations were allowed for 
convergence, with very small random initialization of 𝐩 and 
zero initial duals, with higher initial values, the algorithm would 
require as little as 500 iterations to converge, which is not much 
more than in [11] despite the presence of a vector objective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lastly, the tradeoff between welfare and fairness was 
investigated. Multiple simulations were carried out with 
random initialization of the primal and dual variables.  Fig. 9 
depicts the resulting Pareto front. 
Fig. 8. Welfare and Jain’s index (top), inner product of 
gradients of welfare and fairness (bottom) vs. iteration 
 
Fig. 7. Aggregator power allocations and unit costs 
Fig. 9. Jain’s index vs. welfare 
 
 9 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
This research proposes a general-purpose approach for 
constrained vector optimization. The analytical treatment, 
albeit informal, shows that Pareto optimal solutions can be 
obtained as long as the objectives are strictly quasiconcave. 
This is an improvement over previous approaches, e.g. in, [4], 
[6],[7],[13],[38],[8], which routinely make more restrictive 
assumption of concave utilities. This is of significance as 
general econometric theory does not support prior assumptions 
of concavity, instead treating utilities justifiably as 
quasiconcave functions [47],[48],[49]. Efficiency-fairness 
tradeoff is a crucial issue in resource allocation [39],[50], 
[51],[52] with a significant amount of research using Jain’s 
index (cf. [14],[53],[54]). In establishing the quasiconcavity of 
Jain’s index, this research provides a theoretical justification for 
the application of vector optimization algorithms such as 
ALMA for tradeoff allocations. 
It should be noted here that this research relies significantly 
on recent research. In particular, ALMA obtains the gradient in 
the same direction as in MGDA. The dual variables are 
incremented by the DSO algorithm in the same manner as in 
[14]. The aggregator auction (Section III.A) is a modification 
of those in [7],[38]. Additionally, there are a few limitations of 
this research that are outlined below. 
 It has been assumed that the feasibility constraints in (8) 
were linear equality and inequality constraints. Although 
supported by (3) for the energy grid, this assumption is over-
simplistic for other applications. One possible improvement 
would be to linearize any nonlinear constraints at intermittent 
stages of the optimization algorithm. However, the 
effectiveness of ALMA in such situations needs to be further 
investigated. 
The Pareto front in Fig. 9 was obtained by randomly 
initializing the starting point. However, this approach highlights 
that ALMA can converge to any Pareto-optimal solution. 
Although the present simulation results indicated that any 
additional gain in efficiency was accompanied by a sharp drop 
in fairness, this may not necessarily be the case in other grids, 
and therefore is a potential limitation in ALMA. One option to 
exert more influence on the Pareto-optimal output allocation of 
ALMA, the authors suggest using MGDA’s approach to deal 
with opposing objectives, which suggests the use of relaxation 
algorithms to converge towards generalized Nash equilibrium. 
Alternately, only one of the scalar functions in (7) may be used 
as a scalar objective, while imposing bounds either on the other 
objective or on both, as additional constraints. A similar 
constrained method has been used in [37]. Both approaches 
while remaining quite out of scope in this study, are worthwhile 
directions for further investigation. 
In the absence of any secondary stage to navigate the Pareto 
front until a user-specified suitable point is reached, how useful 
is ALMA for use in the energy grid? Fortunately, in day-ahead 
planning where scheduling is usually done in an hourly manner, 
the allocation 𝐩𝑡 during any hourly time interval 𝑡 would not 
differ significantly from that of the previous interval 𝐩𝑡−1. 
Initializing 𝐩𝑡 to the previous 𝐩𝑡−1, which is not only be 
feasible but also located very close to the desirable region in the 
Pareto front, would allow ALMA to converge to a Pareto 
optimal allocation at least an order of magnitude faster than 
what Fig 8 suggests. ALMA can be used in a similar fashion 
during real time operation, when actual user demands deviate 
from their forecasts. Barring unforeseen weather changes, as 
such deviations are usually very small, the planned value of 𝐩𝑡 
can readily be used as the initial point. Alternately, historical 
values from the DSO’s database can also be adopted for 
initialization during weather related exigencies. Put together, 
these reasons largely obviate the need for ALMA to be 
equipped to move along the Pareto front. 
The step sizes 𝜂𝑘
𝑋 of each dual variable 𝑋 was obtained by 
the DSO algorithm as in [14]. However, energy allocations 
were incremented with 𝜂𝑘
𝑃 being kept proportional to 
(1 + 〈𝒲(𝐩), ℛ(𝐩)〉). This method of stepwise updates made 
ALMA apply increasingly smaller increments as it approached 
the Pareto front. Although simulations in this research indicated 
its effectiveness, theoretical support for such a modification is 
lacking. The authors intend to extend this technique for more 
than two objectives, and to formally establish convergence 
limits with step sizes fashioned in this manner. 
The proposed approach should be compared with novel 
algorithms for CVOP that were published recently in [35],[36], 
both of which appeared during a later phase of this research. In 
a similar manner, the effectiveness of ALMA with more than 
only two objectives, should be investigated in future research. 
The simulation results reported here serve as a proof-of-concept 
for a more general-purpose approach for large-scale constrained 
vector optimization. 
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